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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. 'PAUL HUDSON, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence.-Evidence in a homicide case showing, 
among other things, that defendant, after he and a truck owner 
alighted from the truck which he was driving, hit such owner 
on the side of the face with his fist, knocking him to his hnnds 
and feet, that defendant kicked him about the head and he 
fell to the ground, after which defendant moved him a few 
feet away from the side of the road but did not hide the body, 
that he then took the victim's purse and drove away in the 
victim's truck, and that the body was found three days later, 
death having been caused by cerebral concussion and hemor-
rhage and by a compound fracture of the jaw, is sufficient to 
support a finding that defendant committed the homicide in 
the perpetration of a robbery and that he is therefore guilty 
of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.) 
[ia, 2bj Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error - Instruc-
tions.-Failure to instruct the jury in a homicide case that the 
killing was not in perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate 
robbery if defendant had not formed an intent to rob the 
victim until after the fatal blows were struck and he 
dragged the victim's body into a ditch constitutes prejudicial 
error where such instruction sets forth defendant's only avail-
able defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of first degree 
murder, where the evidence is not inconsistent with defend-
ant's testimony that his attack on the victim was the result 
of a sudden quarrel and that the taking of his property was 
an afterthought, and where the evidence is inconsistent with 
the theory of a planned robbery and indicates that the crime 
was committed by a person whose behavior was generally 
erratic and who was at the time at least partially under the 
influence of ahohol. 
[3] Id.-Burden of Proof.-The burden of proof is on the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to prove defendant guilty of first de-
gree murder beyond a reasonable doubt j it is not incumbent 
on defendant to convince the jury that his version of what 
occurred is true. 
['] Id.-Bvidence.-Defendant in a homicide case is entitled to be 
found guilty of no more than murder of second degree if his 
testimony, viewed in the light of other evidence, is sufficient 
to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of first degree 
murder. • 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, ~ 17. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, ~ 145(5); [2] Homicide, 
§ 270; [3] Homicide, § 141; [4] I:Iomicide, § l~ _ 
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APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. 
Clark Clement, Judge. Reversed . 
• Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, reversed. 
Charles W. Jennings, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing 
the death penalty following defendant's conviction of first 
degree murder. 
The following facts are undisputed: At approximately 
2 p. m. on July 6, 1954, defendant was drinking beer in 
a bar, the Black Cat Cafe, in the town of Stratford. Shortly 
thereafter William rruttle came into the bar wearing a dis-
tinctive black hat. He and defendant engaged in conversa-
tion. At that time defendant had no money and Tuttle 
bought him a beer. Between 2 :30 and 3 p. m. defendant and 
Tuttle left the bar together, taking four cans of beer with 
them. Defendant told the bartender that they were going 
for a ride. They were next seen sitting together in Tuttle's 
green 1952 Ford pickup truck, which was parked by a clump 
of shade trees near the edge of town. Thereafter they went 
to Tuttle's cabin, which was located in an agricultural labor 
camp outside of Stratford. They remained at the cabin 
for half an hour drinking beer before they started back to 
town. The drive back was interrupted by Tuttle's wish to 
urinate. Both defendant and Tuttle alighted from the truck 
at a point along a rural road. Defendant hit Tuttle on the 
side of the face with his fist. The blow knocked Tuttle to 
his hands and knees, whereupon defendant kicked him about 
the head, and he fell to the ground. Defendant moved him a 
few feet away from the side of the road but did not hide the 
body. He then took Tuttle's purse and drove away in Tuttle's 
truck. The body was found three days later. It was in a 
"fairly advanced" state of decomposition, but an autopsy 
showed that death was caused by cerebral concussion and 
hemorrhage and by a compound fracture of the jaw, both 
owing to blows about the head and face. In his testimony 
at the trial, the autopsy surgeon stated that the concu.s&oD, 
I 
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hemorrhage, and fracture were combined causes and that 
one of them could not be singled out as the sole cause of death. 
Within an hour after having ~eft with Tuttle, defendant re-
turned to Stratford driving Tuttle's truck and wearing 
Tuttle's black hat. He went into th~ Black Cat Cafe and 
paid for the beer that he had purcha.sed on credit earlier in 
the day before leaving with Tuttle. He also bought drinks 
for everybody in the bar and bought 24 cans of beer and 
two hamburgers to take with him. On leaving the Black Cat 
Cafe, he went across the street to a grocery store, where he 
was known, and bought a pint of whiskey and some luncheon 
meat. He put his purchases in Tuttle's truck and started to 
drive out of town. He stopped at a service station to buy gas 
and oil for the truck. He drove away and had an accident at 
the edge of town in which the truck was turned over and his 
right foot severely cut. He urged two witnesses to the acci-
dent not to call an ambulance or the police and stood talking 
with them until his brother arrived and drove him to his 
brother's home just outside of Stratford. Defendant stayed 
there overnight. On the following day, his brother drove 
him to Corcoran where he took a cab to Fresno. After staying 
in Fresno overnight, he boarded a bus for Arizona. He 
ultimately made his way to EI Paso, Texas, where he called 
on the sheriff's office and the highway patrol for help in 
entering a hospital to obtain treatment for an infection in 
his injured foot. He was apprehended before leaving the 
hospital, in which he had registered under his own name, 
and returned to Kings County to stand trial on charges of 
murder, robbery, and theft of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 503). 
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity. In his testimony at the trial, however, hE' admitted 
the robbery and the theft of the vehicle. He also admitted 
that he had struck Tuttle in the face with his fist and that 
he had kicked him about the head. He explained that he 
and Tuttle had been discussing the possibility of defendant's 
buying the truck from Tuttle and that on the way back to 
Stratford defendant had asked permission to drive in order 
"to try it out." Tuttle gave his permission but when they 
stopped at the place where the killing occurred they had an 
argument over Tuttle's complaint that defendant was driving 
too fast and recklessly. Defendant testified that the 'blows 
were the result of this argument and that he did not form 
an intent to rob until after the attack had ceased: "Mr. 
Tuttle iets out of the car 011 the opposite side of the driver. 
) 
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----_ .. _---
1 got out of the ear. I come around to the front of the car 
and we got in a little argument there. \V ell like the testimony 
said that he was going to pass water so when he started to do 
that I hit him and knocked him down. He was down on all 
fOll1'S, I knew that I was on parole,· just out of the peni-
tentiary and I knew that would mess me up right there so 
I kicked the man and when I kicked him he went on down, 
and I decided then 1 got to take his money and get out of 
here for 1 haven't got any. So I took his money and from 
where I left the man when they found the body it was at 
least ten feet from where I left it. The reason I moved the 
body from what they say was out from under the wheels 
of the back of the car was I wouldn't run over him." (Italics 
added.) 
In rebuttal, the prosecution offered in evidence a pretrial 
confession. Defendant objected to its introduction on the 
ground that it was involuntary in that it had been obtained 
by the use of a threat by the sheriff of Kings County. De-
fendant testified that the sheriff threatened to do everything 
in his power to send defendant's brother to the penitentiary 
unless defendant confessed. Defendant's brother was men-
tally deficient and had been in a mental institution, and de-
fendant was anxious to shield him. The sheriff denied mak. 
ing the threat, however, and the trial judge admitted the 
confession. In the confession defendant admitted the robbery, 
the theft, and the assault on Tuttle. He also said that he 
had formed the intent to rob before he and Tuttle had gone 
to the latter's cabin and thus before any blows had been 
struck. 
On the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant 
waived a trial by jury. rrhe only evidence introduced was 
the written opinion of the two psychiatrists who were ap-
pointed by the court to examine defendant. They agreed 
that defendant was legally sane at the time of the crime, and 
the court found accordingly. 
[1] Even if the contested confession is disregarded, the 
foregoing evidence is sufficient to support a finding that de-
fendant committed the homicide in the perpetration of a 
robbery, that he was legally sane at the time of the crime, 
and that he is therefore guilty of murder in the first degree. 
(Pen. Code, § 189; People v. Cutt'nine, 41 Ca1.2d 384, 387 [260 
P.2d 16].) [23.] Defendant contends, however, that the trial 
-Defenuant was on parole from Hol"uau Prison where he had beea 
coAiULed aftel" havlll" beeR collvicted Q! P&BSini 1I.ctitioua ~ 
, 
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court committed prejudicial error by refusing to i llstruct 
the jury on his theory of the case. He offered the following 
instruction, wllich the trial cou'tt refused to give: 
"If you find that Defendant, PAUL HUDSON had not formed 
an intention to rob WILLIAM TUTTLE until after he struck 
WILLIAM TUTTLE, dragged his body into the ditch then you 
are instructed that WILLIAM TUTTLE was not killed by PAUL 
HUDSON in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the 
crime of robbery." 
In People v. Carnine, 41 Ca1.2d 384 [260 P.2d 16], the 
failure to give such an instruction was held to be prejudicial 
error because the defendant had testified that "he never 
intended to kill Mr. Rosenbaum and did not decide to take 
the property until after the attack had terminated" and 
because the other evidence was "not inconsistent with de-
fendant's testimony that his attack on Mr. Rosenbaum was 
the result of a sudden quarrel" rather than being the means 
of effecting a planned robbery or burglary. (41 Ca1.2d at 
388,391; see also People v. Kerr, 37 Ca1.2d 11, 13-14 [229 P.2d 
777].) The attorney general contends, however, that de-
fendant's own testimony· demonstrates that the Carnine case 
is inapplicable "because [his testimony shows that] the intent 
to rob arose after he had knocked Mr. Tuttle down, but before 
the termination of his attack upon Mr. Tuttle, i.e., before he 
kicked Mr. Tuttle in the face and on the head at the base of 
the skull." [Italics added.] Defendant's testimony does not 
sustain that contention. In his testimony quoted above de-
fendant explicitly stated that the blow with his fist knocked 
-In addition to the testimony quoted above, the People cite the fol-
lowing excerpts: "I hit him. He was fixing to pass water when I hit 
him. Q. Then after you hit him he fe1l7 A. He fell down on his 
hands and knees. Q. And after that, after he was down, you stated you 
kicked him' A. Yes, I kicked him. Q. Then your testimony is, is it not, 
that after you had him on the ground you decided to take his property' 
A. That is when I actually decided to take his money, is on account that 
I was on parole, and I knew that I was messed up anyway, and that's 
why I took his money and his car .••• Q. You did not intend to rob him 
nntil after he was on the ground,1I.fter you knocked him down 7 A. That's 
correct •••• Q. Why did you feel you had to rob him, Mr. Hudson' 
A. I didn't have no money and I had to get away from there on account, 
you know, if you get in a fight or anything while you are on parole, 
parole can be violated and that is the reason I left on account I took 
his money and the car, so on account I was on parole I had to gllt out 
ot there. Q. Mr. Hudson, when did you intend to rob him' A. I in-
tended to rob the man after I had knocked him down .... Q. When did 
you first intend to rob the man then' A. After T got llim (lowlI. Q. II. ft(~r 
you got him Ilown' A. YC!l, !lir. Q. You didn't intend to lob him uefore 
lOU lwocked him dOWlli A. No, sir." 
) 
) 
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Tuttle to his hands and knees, that after he "was down on all 
fours" defendant kicked him and "he went on down," and 
that" I decided then I got to take his money and get out of 
here for I haven't got any." [Italics added.] Thus, his testi-
mony is clear that the intent to rob was not formed until 
after the attack had ceased and the deceased was lying un-
eonscious on the ground. We must therefore conclude that 
the requested instruction should have been given. 
Since defendant admitted that he had attacked Tuttle and 
had thereafter stolen his purse and his truck, his only avail-
able defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of murder in 
the first degree was that set forth in the refused instruction. 
Although the jury was not required to believe defendant'8 
testimony that he did not decide to steal Tuttle's property 
until after the assault was completed (People v. Kerr, supra, 
37 Ca1.2d 11, 14), he was nevertheless entitled to have them 
properly instructed on the defense raised thereby. (People 
v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 772-774 [228 P.2d 281], and cases 
cited.) 
The other evidence introduced at the trial is not inconsistent 
with defendant's testimony that his attack on Tuttle was the 
result of a sudden quarrel and that the taking of his property 
was an afterthought. The evidence is inconsistent with the 
theory of a planned robbery. Defendant did not choose a 
victim from whom he could expect to obtain any large amount 
of money. He met his victim in a bar where both were known. 
Defendant called attention to the fact that they were leaving 
together. After the attack, he made no effort to conceal the 
body. He returned immediately to the bar driving Tuttle's 
truck and wearing his hat. He made a conspicuous display 
of having money to spend, which the bartender knew he did 
not have before he left with Tuttle. He stopped at a grocery 
store where he was known, and at a gasoline station in Strat-
ford. After wrecking the truck, he made no effort to run 
away but chatted with two witnesses to the wreck until his 
brother arrived and drove him home. Had he planned to 
rob Tuttle and then killed him to prevent his identification as 
a robber, it is unlikely that he would leave a trail so easily 
followed. 
As in the Carnine case, "The evidence presents a picture 
of a crime committed by a person whose behavior was gen-
erally erratic and who was at the time at least partially 
under the influence of alcohol. The crime had few, if any, 
of the indicia of careful planning. Under these circum-
Sept. 1955] PEOPLE v. HUDSO~ 
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stances it was a close question whether defendant first de-
cided to rob [the victim] and then limed him in the perpe-
tration of that robbery or first L attacked him without pre-
meditation and only thereafter decided to steal his property. 
·'It cannot be inferred from the fact that the jury brought 
in a verdict of murder of the first rather than of the second 
degree that it decided this question against defendant. The 
instructions· on second degree murder carefully pointed out 
that murder could not be of the second degree if it was 
committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary. Thus 
these instructions referred the jury to those defining murder 
committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary, and 
as pointed out above, none of the latter instructions explained 
to the jury defendant's only defense to the charge of murder 
committed in the perpetration of a robbery. 
[3] "In determining whether the error was prejudicial, it 
bears emphasis that the burden was on the prosecution to 
prove defendant guilty of murder of the first degree beyond 
a reasonable doubt. It was not incumbent upon defendant to 
convince the jury that his version of what occurred was true. 
[4] He was entitled to be found guilty of no more than 
murder of the second degree if his testimony viewed in the 
light of the other evidence was sufficient to create a reason-
able doubt as to his guilt of murder of the first degree." 
(41 Ca1.2d at 391-392.) [2b] Under these circumstances, 
the refusal of the court to instruct the jury on defendant's 
theory of the case substantially and prejudicially affected the 
rights of defendant. Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to 
prevent a miscarrh:.ge of justice. 
The judgment of conviction of murder of the first degree 
is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., ooneurred. 
.. 
-The instructions given in the present case were substantially the 
laDle .. those given in the Carnine case. (See 41 Cal.2d at 388-389.) 
